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for information. However, the storing of human tissue samples
and genetic information for research and/or therapeutic purposes raises a number of serious privacy and
autonomy concerns., These concerns are compounded
when one considers the possibility that a biobank or
its owner might go bankrupt.2 Insolvency impairs the
ability of enforcement regimes, and liability-based
regimes in particular, to enforce legal norms. 3 The goal
of this essay is to develop guideposts for thinking about
private and public enforcement of privacy imposed by
donors on tissue samples and/or genetic information
when a biobank becomes insolvent.
As with any form of nonpublic, personally identifiable
information, the use of human tissues for purposes
other than those for which they were donated ("secondary use") raises important substantive policy issues.
When I consent to medical treatment, do I consent to
have my blood used in a research study? Is this consent
limited to the doctors at the hospital where I am
treated? What about private pharmaceutical companies, attempting to develop drug treatments? If I do
consent to such secondary use, do I waive any rights to
share in the financial benefits earned by any therapy developed using my tissue? If my consent was procured
hastily on the eve of emergency surgery, and as a precondition to that surgery, should any such consent be
viewed as binding? 4 These concerns can be respectively
categorized as (1) scope of consent (what did I agree
to?), (2) permissible secondary use (what uses of my tissue are permissible even though I did not expressly
consent to them?), and adhesion (was my consent
meaningful and voluntary?). Unavoidably, these substantive concerns will inform this article, but they are
not its focus: The focus of this essay is on remedies, and
specifically how best to enforce limitations on secondary use when a biobank becomes insolvent. The
key, I argue, is to tie the use restrictions directly to the
information (or sample) itself,rather than focusing, as
most regulation does, on the act of transferring information.
This article proceeds in three steps. Part I describes
a typology of remedies for privacy violations that depends on whether rights are enforced through a property based regime, a liability based regime or a regime
of public enforcement. Part II explains how the choice
of enforcement regime affects the level of protection accorded a privacy entitlement when a biobank becomes
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The storing of human tissue samples and genetic
information for research and/or therapeu[tic
purposes raises a number of serious priva cy
and autonomy concerns. These concerns are
compounded when one considers the pos sibility
that a biobank or its owner might go ban krupt.
insolvent. Liability based protection focuses on the act
of transfer and gives the least protection in bankruptcy.
Property based protection focuses on the item itself,
and provides substantially more. 5 Public enforcement
regimes are unaffected by bankruptcy, but the level of
protection is indeterminate, depending on how prosecutorial resources are allocated, and on whether restrictions on tissue or information use "run with the
sample:' Part III explores the problems for biobanking
that may be created by a purely property based regime.
While property based protection provides the greatest
protection for donor autonomy, the property right created should not be freely and completely alienable, nor
should it be absolute. Adhesion, bounded rationality,
and information asymmetry have the potential to render even property-based protection no protection at
all. 6 At the same time, absolute protection of genetic
privacy has the potential to destroy the common benefits obtained through the aggregation of data.7 This article concludes by suggesting a collective mechanism for
empowering bankruptcy courts to use a cy pres approach rooted in the bankruptcy concept of "adequate
protection" to balance privacy protections with research
and therapeutic imperatives.
The Question
To facilitate discussion, a concrete fact pattern might be
helpful. Imagine that Paul Patient goes to the doctor for
a cancer treatment. Dave Doctor asks Patient if he will
agree to provide a blood sample for a biobank
("Biobank") that his hospital is building to help study
genetic link factors in cancer, and perhaps develop a
new treatment. Patient agrees, authorizing Biobank to
use his blood sample and related information for "research devoted to identifying the role of genetics in
cancer and to develop new therapies:' For two years, the
project runs along as expected, making some important
advances.
Then Doctor's hospital finds itself in financial difficulty. A private pharmaceutical company, called Genscreen, offers the hospital (and Doctor's project) a significant amount of money for access to the blood
samples collected by Doctor, and for access to the information (excluding names) about those samples in
Doctor's database. Instead of using the samples to iden-

tify cancer risks and develop treatment,

Genscreen intends to develop a cheap
screening device which will identify genetic risk of cancer and allow insurance
companies to exclude people with high
risk from coverage. This is not the purpose for which Donor donated his blood,
nor is it a use for which he gave consent,
nor would he give consent if asked. What
happens if the Biobank goes bankrupt? Can it sell samples to Genscreen in violation of its promises to Patient? Does Patient have a breach of contract claim?
What happens to Patient's breach of contract claim in
bankruptcy? Should the answer to these questions
change if the purchaser of the data is seeking to develop
a cure for heart disease?

Property, Liability and Public Enforcement:
Outside of Bankruptcy
Outside of bankruptcy, the status of Patient's claim receives different levels of protection depending on how
Patient's rights are characterized. They may be protected, to use Calabresi and Melamed's dichotomy, by
a "property" rule, a "liability" rule, or to reach beyond
the Calabresian terminology, by public enforcement
(which may in turn be civil or criminal).8 Calabresi and
Melamed draw the line between property and liability
based on whether an obligor such as Biobank can
choose to breach its obligation and pay damages - a liability rule, or the obligation will be enforced by an affirmative order, and enforced by contempt, punitive
damages, or criminal sanction - a property rule. 9 Others have focused on whether the right binds specific
people, or whether the entitlement runs with an object,
or bundle of entitlements.1° As Hansmann and Kraakman put it:

For our purposes, the attribute that distinguishes a
property right from a contract right is that a property right is enforceable, not just against the original grantor of the right, but also against other persons to whom possession of the asset, or other
rights in the asset, are subsequently transferred."
These two definitions are not necessarily inconsistent.
However, the focus is different. Under the Calabresian
approach to property, the focus is on the ability of the
rights holder to unilaterally veto any transfer. Under the
Hansmann and Kraakman approach, the focus is not
on veto, but on whether any subsequent taker of the
"property" takes subject to the rights of the initial transferor.
The question of public versus private enforcement, by
contrast, goes to standing, rather than the nature of
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the remedy per se. Entitlements may be enforceable
through both public and private right of action, or they
may be enforceable only privately, or only by public officials. Public enforcement may be property-like, in that
violation is criminal, or enforced through high fines or
statutory damages, or the relief can be liability-like,
compensatory in nature, and tied to actual damage
caused. The difference between public enforcement
and private enforcement is that a party driven system
is traded for, or supplemented by, a regime of prosecutorial discretion.
Figure I

How does the law protect promises not to share information with companies like Genscreen? To the extent that they are based in contract, the focus is on
Biobank's promise to Patient. The general rule is that
Patient's rights are only against Biobank, and are protected only by a liability rule. Patient's rights can only
be asserted against the contracting party. Patient's
rights do not inhere in the information or the sample
itself. The principal remedy for contractual violations
is compensatory damages.12 While specific performance
of the promise through injunctive relief may be available, such relief is considered extraordinary,'3 and, as
discussed below, is of limited use in bankruptcy. 14While
federal copyright and patent law give the status of property to certain forms of intellectual property, the same
is not true for personal information, or for non-disclosure promises. The promise not to disclose, except for
the purposes consented to, does not carry with it a veto
right, or a right that runs with the Paul Patient's blood
sample. 15
Contract law is not the only source of protection,
however. There are a number of federal statutes that
might enhance privacy protection through public enforcement. For example, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC) protects against deceptive trade
practices. 16 The FTC has acted to enforce privacy promises under Section 5,17 and they would likely be troubled
by sale of tissue in a biobank in violation of a promise
not to do so. States also have their own deceptive trade
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practices acts, some of which provide for private rights
of action, which may give rise to a right to an injunction.Is The recently promulgated Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations
also place limit on disclosure of personal information
without consent. 19 Neither the FTC Act, nor the HIPAA
regulations provide for a private right of action. Thus,
enforcement is subject to prosecutorial discretion and
is not party driven.
Finally, about 25 states have enacted statutes which
give some form of protection to the privacy of genetic
information. The various approaches reflect little consistency. Some give genetic information express status
as property. Others give property-like protection, in
that they prohibit use of genetic information without
consent, regardless of how the information was obtained. Others give only liability based protection. Some
provide only for public enforcement, some allow a private right of action. A table is set forth in the Appendix
to this article. Manyjurisdictions, however, say nothing,
and offer no specific protection beyond state common
law, and the federal overlays described above.
Property,Liability and Public Enforcement
in Bankruptcy
The distinction between property, liability, and public
enforcement is important outside of bankruptcy. The
importance is even greater when a debtor becomes insolvent. Property rights are generally respected in bankruptcy, while liability based claims are generally discharged, and paid, if at all, in cents on the dollar.
Treatment ofContract(Liability-based)Claims
in Bankruptcy
Both inside and outside of bankruptcy, the insolvency
of a debtor undercuts the effectiveness of a liabilitybased regime. Outside of bankruptcy, this is manifested
through the so-called "judgment proof" problem. A
debtor who is going to be unable to pay a damage judgment may have less compunction about invading the
rights of others.20
Imagine, for example, that, in an effort to stave off
bankruptcy, Biobank sells Patient's information to Genscreen. Assume that this is a breach of contract, and
would give rise to liability. One problem common to privacy contexts is that the damages for such a disclosure
are difficult to calculate. Even assuming, however, that
Patient could prove damages of, say, $1,000, his recovery will be significantly less than that.
If Biobank or its owner files for bankruptcy, a number of aspects of bankruptcy law undercut the enforcement of promises like that of Biobank to Patient. First,
when a debtor files for bankruptcy, an automatic stay
goes into effect which prohibits any action to collect on
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or enforce a prepetition obligation.21 At the conclusion
of the bankruptcy case, those obligations are discharged.22 Second, while Patient would be free to
assert a claim for breach of contract in
Biobank's bankruptcy case, damages
would be treated as general unsecured

to grant Patient a "property interest" in personal information. Those states are: Colorado, Florida, Georgia
and Louisiana. The nature of the property right in each

By contr ast, if Patient is viewed as "owning" his
genetic information, then Patient will receive

claims, and paid pro ratawith other such
claims, likely in cents on the dollar.23 For better tr eatment in bankruptcy. If an obligation
example, if Biobank has outstanding of the de btor is secured by an interest in specific
unsecured claims of $100,000, and property
of the debtor, the creditor will be treated
unencumbered assets of $15,000, then
Y
Patient's recovery will only be fifteen as havin a "secured claim:'
cents on the dollar, or $150. Biobank will
not have fully internalized the harm caused by its acts.
state is different. In none of them, however, is the "propIndeed, if the only safeguard against disclosure of inerty" right one that would entitle Patient to preferred
formation is a contract claim, this same principle of
treatment in bankruptcy.
discharge and pro rata distribution may allow Biobank
For example, in Georgia, while legislative findings
to sell Patient's information post-bankruptcy, in the incharacterize genetic information as "property" they only
terest of maximizing the value of its assets for the benprovide a remedy in the event that an insurer misuses
efit of its creditors. Similarly, if Biobank's promise of
the information. The statute does not provide a right of
confidentiality is treated as an executory contract,
action in the event that Biobank itself misuses the inBiobank will likely have the power to "reject" or breach
formation. Louisiana, by contrast, gives some meaning
the promise post-petition and have Patient's claim
to the concept of "property," by saying that storing getreated as "prepetition,' and dischargeable.24 Even if
netic information without authorization will give rise
the contract is entitled to specific enforcement outside
to liability and in some cases treble damages. However,
of bankruptcy, the trustee's strong-arm power may
even these statutes which purport to create a property
render that property-like protection "avoidable" and
right don't necessarily give Patient rights beyond
unenforceable against creditors.25 If the contract is
damages.
viewed as non-executory, then rejection may not even
Even if Patient is given a property interest in tissue
26
be necessary.
samples and/or genetic information, the power of the
debtor to sell assets free and clear of liens and interProperty
ests under 363(f) may pose some risk. Section 363(f)
By contrast, if Patient is viewed as "owning" his genetic
provides:
information, then Patient will receive better treatment
in bankruptcy. If an obligation of the debtor is secured
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b)
by an interest in specific property of the debtor, the
or (c) of this section free and clear of any interest in
creditor will be treated as having a "secured claim."27 Sesuch property of an entity other than the estate, only
cured status confers on the creditor a number of beneif:
fits. First, in any distribution, the secured creditor is en(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale
titled to receive payment of the value of his or her
of such property free and clear of such interest;
collateral.2 More generally, if property of the debtor is
(2) such entity consents;
encumbered by an interest that would be enforceable
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which
against third parties outside of bankruptcy, subject to
such property is to be sold is greater than the
certain specific avoiding powers, discussed below, that
aggregate value of all liens on such property;
encumbrance will be respected. Finally, and most im(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
portantly, there are restrictions on the debtor's ability
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal
to sell the property free of the non-debtor's property
or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
interest.29
satisfaction of such interest.30
Unlike patent, copyright, or other forms of intellectual property, there is no federal statute giving personal
Thus, in bankruptcy, a debtor has the ability to sell free
information the status of property. In the absence of a
and clear of liens and interests, so long as any one of the
special statute conferring such a right, Patient will not
five criteria listed in 363(f) is satisfied, and the interest
have the status of an owner, entitled to adequate proholder is provided with adequate protection of its intection. Four states have enacted statutes that purport
terest under section 363(e). Thus, whether section
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distinction between rights enforceable through dam363(f) will permit sale of tissue samples or genetic inages and rights enforceable by affirmative order. As
formation free and clear of a promise not to do so will
noted above, Hansmann and Kraakman focus instead
depend on the nature of the protection given to that
on rights that run with the property. Here, the
right outside of bankruptcy. If a liability rule is used
Louisiana statute is illustrative. It contains a restriction
apply.
Even
if
the
protection
is
in
the
nature
(f)(1) will
on "onward transfer." It is notjust Biobank's transfer of
of a lien, or a statutory fine, then (f)(3) or (f)(5) might
Patient's genetic information to Genscreen that vioapply. If the lien or interest can be stripped off, the inholder
is
still
entitled
to
adequate
terest
protection of that interest. 31 However, the A regim e which subjects users to liability unless
nature of that protection will again turn they can demonstrate consent of the donor
on the nature of the underlying interest.
mitigate s the harm caused to donors by the
Under current law, the status is uncertain
bankruf itcy of a biobank.
at best.
The general rule is that debtors cannot
lates the statute. Any storage or use of the information
sell property out from under restrictive covenants or
without Patient's consent would subject Genscreen to
other property interests that are not in the nature of a
liability. In short, a regime which subjects users to lialien. For example, in Gouveia v. Tazbir 2 a debtor was
bility unless they can demonstrate consent of the donor
clear
of
restrictive
unable to sell real property free and
mitigates the harm caused to donors by the bankruptcy
covenants contained in the debtor's deed. However,
of a biobank.
bankruptcy courts, when considering whether to allow
Under current law, however, the focus of state law
an asset to be sold free of an encumbrance must weigh
regulating transfer and use of genetic information
the impact of prohibiting the sale on the bankruptcy
seems calculated to maximize the effect of bankruptcy
case as a whole. Recent cases manifest this tension. In
rather than to minimize it. As noted above, only four
a recent ninth Circuit case, In re Rodeo Canyon Develstates characterize the privacy entitlement as property.
opment Corporation,33 the Ninth Circuit held that a
To the extent that other states have passed statutes safebankruptcy court could not sell property free and clear
guarding genetic privacy, 25 states prohibit unauthoof interests until it had first adjudicated the status of the
rized transfer of information. Only 11 prohibit genetic
asserted ownership interest. By contrast, in In re Trans
WorldAirlines,the Third Circuit held that where TWA
testing without consent, 5 prohibit accessing genetic inwas selling all of its assets to American Airlines, that
formation without consent, and 6 prohibit retaining
genetic information without consent. Thus, the most
sale could be accomplished free and clear of certain
common form of regulation focuses on unauthorized
successor liability claims, on the theory that those
transfer of genetic information. This is an important
claims could be reduced to a money judgment. 34 And,
protection, but because it focuses on the transferor,
in PrecisionIndustriesv. QualitechSteel,35 the Seventh
rather than the user of the information, the effect is in
Circuit held that property encumbered by a lease could
personam rather than in rem, and the insolvency of the
be sold free and clear of that lease, even where other
transferor is likely to limit the effect of such regulation.
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would have preRegulations that prohibit access, use or storage of invented such sale (if the lessee had objected at the time).
formation without consent reach beyond the single inWhere the assets of an entire business are being sold,
solvent transferor, and deprive the information (unacand the package has value which exceeds those of its
individual parts, courts have shown a willingness
companied by consent) of its value.
to stretch the limits of section 363(f) to get the job
PublicEnforcement
done. 36 While adequate protection is still available
Bankruptcy has somewhat less serious impact on rights
under section 363(e), it is difficult to figure out how to
that are protected by public enforcement. The autogive meaning to that term where genetic privacy is
matic stay in bankruptcy contains an exception for both
concerned.
criminal prosecutions, and litigation aimed at protectIn Personamv. In Rem
Figuring out how and when to permit transfer of tissue
samples and genetic information free of Patient's consent is the key question posed by bankruptcy. The key
incident of "property" that can mitigate the effect of
bankruptcy on privacy is to focus on the "in rem" nature
of property rights. Calabresi and Melamed focus on the
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ing "public safety."3 7 To give one example, a company

known as Toysmart sought to sell customer lists in
bankruptcy after promising prior to bankruptcy not to
do so. The FTC sought to enjoin the sale under Section
5 of the FTC Act, and obtained an injunction. The action by the FTC was not stayed, and the sale was
blocked. State and federal statutory schemes that pro-
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vide for public enforcement and injunctive relief as part
of the remedial scheme are not affected by the bankruptcy of a biobank.
Public enforcement is not a panacea, however. Where
the disclosure happens before the enforcement action
can be brought, insolvency will still limit the impact of
enforcement where the remedies are limited to monetary damages or fines. Such fines Ahile assertable in the
bankruptcy, may be subject to subordination, to the extent that they are non-compensatory, and even if not
subordinated will be payable in cents on the dollar.38
Perhaps more important, however, than the right to
public enforcement per se is the ability to enforce
Biobank's privacy obligations on subsequent holders of
Patient's information.
II.
As discussed above, the principal effect of bankruptcy
on a regime seeking to protect the privacy of personal
information in biobanks is to limit the effectiveness of
monetary remedies as a disincentive to disclosure. This
presents a problem under current law. While a number
of federal statutes provide for public enforcement of genetic privacy and a number of states have statutes that
create private rights of action, the default is that the
protection of genetic privacy lies in contract, and contract rights are enforced through liability rules.
There are two remedies for this problem. Both remedies involve giving genetic information the attributes of
property. The first might be to give the donor of genetic
information a right in the nature of a lien, which would
be entitled to adequate protection. This would provide
some protection to the information insofar as it was
being used by the debtor in bankruptcy, and it would require compensation if the information was sold. But
liens are generally satisfied by selling the property subject to the lien, and by paying the proceeds to the lienholder. Where the harm caused by disclosure of genetic
information is principally dignitary, and where the
value of a particular tissue sample is relatively small,
this protection may be little better than a liability rule.
Second, we might follow the lead of Louisiana and prohibit any use of the information without authorization.
In other words, genetic information would be treated as
another form of intellectual property, where any use
must be pursuant to a license from the creator/donor.
If protection of Patient's privacy is the goal of the
statute, then an essential attribute of any property
regime is that Patient's conditions on the use of his information run with the information itself.
However, while minimizing the effect of bankruptcy
on privacy protections is a laudable goal where genetic
information is involved, there are problems with a pure
property regime that need to be addressed. These prob-

lems fall into two broad categories: (1) market imperfections and (2) coordination problems. The first
leads to the underprotection of privacy in a simple
property regime, and the second focuses on inefficiencies and welfare loss caused by overprotection of property rights in a simple property regime. I will discuss
these in order.
First, one concern about a simple property regime
goes to the quality of the consent. How was it obtained?
Was it fully voluntary? This issue looms large in the
medical literature on informed consent. 39 Concerns
about adhesion, information asymmetry, and bounded
rationality also play a role in the privacy debate.40 One
can imagine Patient in the above scenario granting
blanket consent to use of his DNA in a number of ways
that would raise concerns. First, cognition and information asymmetry can cast doubt on the validity of
consent. The consent to use of the genetic material for
research purposes may have been obtained as part of
consent to treatment. The two may have been contained
on the same form, and Patient may not have even realized that he/she was giving the doctors a right to make
secondary use of genetic information. Further, adhesion
plays a role here too. Sometimes agreement to participate in a study is the only way that a Patient can obtain
access to a particular treatment. Where treatment and
information sharing are linked as a take it or leave it
proposition, Patient has no choice but to consent.
Where this is the case, the best property protection
will not help. 41 Property based protection is worthless
without some legal efforts to police bargains, and/or
create spheres of inalienability, where even blanket consents are interpreted as having certain limits.
Second, property can be overprotective of privacy.42

Banking of genetic information for public purposes can
produce important social benefits. There are perfectly
good public health reasons for invading a person's
privacy in the interest of identifying and/or curing
diseases. The identity of Patient need not necessarily
be revealed to the researcher, but certain medical information might be important. A strict property
regime, limiting any use of information without consent, might deprive society of these important benefits.
43
This problem has been described as an anticommons.
Where property rights are fragmented, and any stakeholder has the ability to veto the use of common property, coordination problem may result in the destruction of, or underuse of the common asset. Biobanks are
such common assets. The value of genetic data lies not
in the information about the individual alone, but in the
ability to aggregate data about many people and to note
trends and patterns. If an individual, or a significant
group, withholds consent, important research can be
stifled.
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III.
Thus propertization my be necessary in order to protect
genetic privacy in the event of bankruptcy, but two additional components may also be necessary to strike
the appropriate balance. To deal with problems like adhesion, bounded rationality, and information asymmetry, it may be necessary to police the privacy bargains
struck by patients and information donors. This policing may take a number of forms. For example, it might
take the form of a sticky default rule, where express consent or specific consideration are required to give effect
to consent. It could also take the form of an inalienability rule, prohibiting blanket consents, and/or even
prohibiting consent to certain uses of genetic information. Finally, it could take the form of a standard form
license, where the terms and scope of consent are specified by law instead of private negotiation. Which of
these forms should be used is beyond the scope of this
article, and will probably vary significantly depending
on context.

44

In addition to policing the bargain to protect individuals from overreaching or overbroad consents, it
may also be necessary to limit the ability of individuals
to tie up their information, and prohibit its use. The
public interest in gathering information necessary to
protect public health, or to develop effective therapies
may trump the individual's desire to sequester genetic
data. Any such limits on privacy should, of course, be
narrowly tailored to a necessary public purpose, and the
compulsory use of the information should carry with it
privacy safeguards, such as removal of names and other
identifying information.
These comments go, however, to the substance of genetic privacy rather than the remedy for violation, and
this, to a certain extent, is the point. While propertization of genetic information may be a solution to the
bankruptcy problem, the scope of the property right,
the extent to which it is alienable, and the extent to
which it is inviolate are all up for grabs. While propertization may be necessary to ensure enforcement of privacy protections, propertization is neither sufficient,
nor is it possible for it to be absolute. Norm and remedy are inextricably linked in the context of genetic privacy. The answers to most of these questions are likely
to be context specific. Hard bargains may need to be
softened, and narrow restrictions on information use
may need to be broadened. These questions will inevitably need to be answered expost.
In an earlier article, I suggested that any mechanism
for making such expost determinations would need to
comprise a pair of key attributes: (1) mandatory muddy
standardization; and (2) a collective procedure for quieting title.45 Mandatory muddy standardization deals
with the fact that informed consent is not, and cannot
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be, about bargaining. The various ways in which tissue
samples and genetic information are, and can be used,
are too complex, too hard to predict, and too hard to describe, for a short conversation between Patient and
Doctor to produce anything but unfortunate and random results. As such, a regime that allowed patients to
specify broad types of use, but which allowed deviations
from those specifications when justified by important
research or therapeutic justifications makes some sense.
The key point is that the source of this rule is unlikely
to be bargained consent. It may take the form of a rule
about deviations from, or limitations on the requirement from consent, but the rule itself is not likely to be
bargained for. Moreover, while such rules may, in the
first instance be legislative, or regulated, in order to
work, they will need some play in the joints in order to
allow decisionmakers to handle the variety of circumstances that may arise. The collective procedure for
quieting title focuses on the decisionmaker. Since
biobanks will, by definition contain samples from and
information about many individuals, there needs to be
a forum and procedure where multiple issues of consent
and multiple parties can be dealt with simultaneously.
That procedure must allow for representation of patient's interests, and authoritative decisions about secondary use.
In my earlier article, I suggested that a flawed, but
promising model is proposed in amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code. That provision, the Leahy Amendment, 46 grants the holders of privacy promises a right

to have their privacy expectations "adequately protected," and provides for the appointment of a "privacy
ombudsmen" charged with negotiating on behalf of,
and representing the interests of the people whose in7
formation is contained in the database.4
The Leahy Amendment has two principal weaknesses. First, it defers absolutely to bargained-for privacy policies where they exist. As such, it is likely to fall
victim to the problems of adhesion, information asymmetry, bounded rationality and coordination described
4
above. It also fails to define "adequate protection:."
These concerns go to substance, rather than remedy. A
procedure like the Leahy Amendment, if properly constructed, has the potential both to protect Patient's privacy and wishes with regard to the use of his genetic information, and to allow for flexibility over time and in
changed circumstances.
Conclusion
In sum, insolvency has the potential to undercut the enforcement of privacy promises made by Biobanks, but
Bankruptcy law may hold promise as a locus for developing procedures which will provide both appropriate
protection and needed flexibility.
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Appendix
State Genetic Privacy Laws

.

Define as Personal Property

Informed Consent Required to

State and Statute
PersonalAccess

to Genetic
Information
Required

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona §20-448.02

Obtain/Access, Retain
Genetic
Genetic
Information
Information

Disclose
Genetic
Information

V_

California Insurance § 10149.1
Colorado § 10-3-1 104-7

_/

V

Delaware §16.2.1220 to
§16.2.1227
Florida §760.40
Georgia §§33-54-I to 8
Hawaii §431 - 10A- 118

Penalties for
!Genetic Privacy
Violations

DNA
Samples

Genetic
Information

V

V

Arkansas SB764

Connecticut

, Specific

------

Perform/
Require
GeneticTest

V

V

V

V

_
_

_/

V

_/

/

V

V

V

V

V

_

_

_

Idaho
Illinois §410-513
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

V

V

Kentucky

V

Louisiana §22:213.7;
§40:1299.6
Maine

V

V

V

Maryland Ins §27-909
Labor & Emp §49B- 15 and 16
Massachusetts I I .70G

V

V
V/

V

Michigan §333,17020
§333.17520
Minnesota

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

375.1309

Nebraska §71-I,

_

104.1

V

Nevada §629, I01 to
629.201
New Hampshire § 141 -H:2

V

_V

New Jersey §10:5-43 to
§ 10:5-49

V

New Mexico §24-21-1 to
24-21-7
NewYork CVR §79-L
North Carolina
North Dakota

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V/

V/

V

V

_/

VV

_

V

V
_V

Ohio
Oklahoma

Oregon §192.531 to

V

V

192.549; SB 618
Pennsylvania

V

V

Rhode Island §27-18-52,
52.3, §27-19-44, 44. I, §2720-39.39. 1,§27-41-53, 53.1

V

V

V

South Carolina §38-93- 10 to

38-93-60
South Dakota SBI
Tennessee
Texas Vernon's Civil §9031
Utah' HB 56

/
/

Vermont §18:9331 to

V

§18:9335
Virginia §38.2-508.4
2
Washington SB 5207
WestVirginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

V_

Total

_V

V
V

N/

4

I

1

5

6

25s

4

0

1

17

I, Limits disclosures of and access to genetic information by employers and insurers. 2.Requires written authorization only Source: NCSL
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS

Edward J. Janger

References
1. M. A. Rothstein, "Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why They
Are So Hard to Protect,"Journal ofLaw, Medicine,& Ethics 26, no.
3 (1998): 198-204 ("If a third party has enough leverage and economic power, it can go to an individual and require him/her to execute a release that authorizes a physician to release the medical
records to a third party."); M. R. Anderlick and M. A. Rothstein,
"Privacy and Confidentiality of Genetic Information: What rules for
the New Science?"AnnualReview of Genomicsand Genetics (20012): 401-33.
2. For a discussion of the effects of bankruptcy on privacy, see E.J.
Janger, "Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information
Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy," William & Mary Law Review 44
(2003): 1801-1881; see also E. J. Janger, "Privacy Property, Information Costs and the Anticommons," Hastings Law Review 54
(2003): 899-929
3. L. M. LoPucki, "The Death of Liability," Yale Law Journal 106
(1996): 1-91, at 3. LoPucki analogizes the liability-based enforcement of rights to a card game:
Think of the liability system as a poker game...Players risk their
chips, that is, their wealth, by tossing them into the pot, that is,
investing them in liability-generating economic activity. Chips
contributed to the pot are at risk of loss; the system can take
them to satisfy liability. Chips withheld are not at risk.
4. The focus of regulation in healthcare is often phrased in terms of
"informed consent." P. H. Schuck, "Rethinking Informed Consent;'
Yale Law Journal103 (1994): 899-959; Rothstein, "Genetic Privacy," supra note 1: ("I believe less emphasis should be placed on
regulating procedures for disclosure of information by physicians
and other holders of medical records and more detailed focus
placed on the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the information by third parties. Who are these third parties? What
need do they have for the information?")
5. As I will discuss below, "property" regimes can operate either as a
"veto" on transfer, or as an encumbrance that runs with the item.
6. Janger, "Muddy Property," supranote 2, at 1852: ("Property rule or
liability rule, the result is the same. Customers give their information away for free.").
7. Janger, "Anticommons," supra note 2: at 921-22.
8. G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral;' HarvardLaw Review 85 (1972): 1089-1128, at 1089.
9. Id.
10. H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, "Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerous Clauses Problem and the Divisibility
of Rights," Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): 373-420, at
378.
11. Id.
12. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 (1979) ("Judicial remedies [for breach of contract] serve to protect.. .his 'expectation interest,' which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed...."). In the absence of a statute allowing
for statutory or punitive damages, or a separate tort cause of action, the financial incentives associated with a liability regime are
likely to understate the actual harm caused by a sale of data. See
Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d. 694 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995) (detailing an unsuccessful attempt to use misappropriation theory to sue electronic bulletin board); D. B. Dobbs,
The Law of Torts (West: Saint Paul, 2000): 1198-1200.
13. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359 ("Specific performance
...
will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the
expectation interest of the injured party.").
14. Janger, "Muddy Property," supra note 2, at 1832-35.
15. Janger, 'Anticommons," supra note 2, at 1823. See also W. W.
Miller, Jr. and M. A. O'Rourke, "Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights:
Which Holds the Trump Card?" HoustonLaw Review 38 (2001):
777-854, at 799-807 (noting that while privacy policies may be enforceable as contracts, the damages are likely to be difficult to calculate).
16.15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).

REGULATION OF BIOBANKS , SPRING 2005

17. In re Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. D. Mass.
filed June 9, 2000). Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Establishing Conditions on Sale of Customer Information, presented by
Toysmart.com, LLC and the Federal Trade Commission, reprinted
Workouts & Bankruptcies in the E-commerce Economy 247, J.
Samet and J. Walshe Murray eds. (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 2001) (reproducing a stipulation and proposed order placing conditions on the sale of customer information by Toysmart.com).
18. Texas Business and Commerce code § 17.50(b) (2004).
19. 45 C.F.R. Parts 160, 164.
20. S. Shavell, "The Judgment Proof Problem," InternationalReview
ofLaw & Economics 6 (1986): 45-58, at 45 ("An injurer will treat
liability that exceeds his assets as imposing an effective financial
penalty only equal to his assets.....
21. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 524.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (allowed unsecured claims), 726 (distribution of
estate property).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
25. V. Countryman, "Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I,"
MinnesotaLaw Review 57(1973): 439-491, at 465,471 n. 121; J.L.
Westbrook, 'A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts,'Minnesota Law Review 74 (1989): 227-337, at 255. Michael Andrew
reaches a similar result by a slightly different route. Under his approach, executory contracts are not binding upon the estate until
assumed. According to Professor Andrew:
[T]he supposed "rule" that there is no specific performance
in bankruptcy is actually just a consequence of the fact that
the estate itself is not, absent assumption, bound by the
debtor's contracts. Not only is there no right of specific performance of an unassumed contract against the estate, there
is likewise no right to recover damages against the estate itself-i.e., administratively. The estate is simply not a party to
the contract.
M. T. Andrew, "Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 'Rejection," University of Colorado Law Review 59
(1988): 845-932, 920-21.
26. J. L. Westbrook, "A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts,"
MinnesotaLaw Review 74 (1989): 227-337, at 246 ("The first concrete consequence of the equality principle is that the trustee can
breach (reject) a contract profitably far more often than can other
contract parties because the trustee pays only a fraction of contract damages rather than the full amount of the Other Party's
breach loss. From that simple proposition flows most of the economic "magic"associated with bankruptcy contract doctrine') See
also, M. T. Andrew, "Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to
Professor Westbrook," University of Colorado Law Review 62
(1991): 1-35 ("But while unnecessary, rejection is also harmless:
It does not make the contract obligation somehow vanish, and its
'breach' consequence does nothing more than create a claim.
Thus, whether the contract is 'executory' or not, the result is the
same: The non-debtor party has a claim.").
27. 11 U.S.C. § 506.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 724.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
30. Id.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
32. See Gouveia v. Tazbir,37 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that debtor is unable to sell land free and clear of restrictive
covenants).
33. 362 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2003).
34. 322 F.3d 283 (3rd Cir. 2003).
35. 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003).
36. For an extreme example, see Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech
SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir., 2003), reh'g denied, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 10626 (7th Cir., May 7, 2003), where a debtor
was allowed to sell leases under section 363(f) without formally
assuming or assignint them under section 365.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
38. 1 U.S.C. § 510(c).
39. Canterburyv. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (1972). For a discussion of in-

SYMPOSIUM

formed consent in healthcare settings, see C. E. Schneider, The
PracticeofAutonomy: Patients,Doctors, and MedicalDecisions,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 87-92; J. Goldstein,
"For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain;' Yale Law
Journal 84 (1975): 683-703, at 690-94; P.H. Schuck, "Rethinking Informed Consent,' Yale Law Journal 103 (1994): 899-959,
at 902-04; A. D. Twerski and N. B. Cohen, "The Second Revolution in Informed Consent," Northwestern University Law Review
94 (1999):1-49, 2-5.
40. See M. J. Radin, "Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment," IndianaLaw Journal75 (2000): 1125-1162, at 1148-49.
Professor Radin explains:
Market-emergent schemes of uniform contracts, on the other
hand, have to some courts and commentators looked like a
property scheme imposed by private companies for their own
interests instead of by the government for the interest of all.
In other words, in public choice rhetoric, the traditional view
has been that legislative enactment is presumptively efficiency-enhancing, and market emergence is presumptively
rent-seeking. Because market-emergent sets of terms are
dictated by one party rather than arrived at by negotiation
between the parties, they have been dubbed contracts of adhesion, or take-it-or-leave-it contracts.

See generally T. D. Rakoff, "Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction," HarvardLaw Review 96 (1983): 1173-1284 (arguing that contracts of adhesion should be presumed to be unenforceable).
41. Janger, "Muddy Property," supranote 2 ("Property rule or liability rule, the result is the same. Customers give their information
away for free.").
42. Janger "Anticommons," supra note 2.
43. M. A. Heller, "The Boundaries of Private Property," YaleLaw Journal 108 (1999): 1163-1223, at 1173-74; M. A. Heller, "The Tragedy
of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets;' HarvardLaw Review 111 (1998): 621-688, at 665-67.
44. P. M. Schwartz, "Property, Privacy, and Personal Data;' Harvard
Law Review 117 (2004): 2055-2128.
45. Janger, 'Anticommons," supra note 2 at 922-26.
46. The Leahy Amendment can be found in sections 231 and 232 of
the conference report to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2002. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107617, at 51-52 (2002).
47. Janger, "Anticommons," supra note 2 at 928-29. Janger, "Muddy
Property," supra note 2 at 1873-75.
48. As a remedy, I have recommended the use of mandatory set of defaults tailored to particular contexts and based on Fair Information Practices, or "FIPS."

JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS

